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INTRODUCTION
The present study seeks to understand how the human
subject may attempt to influence the learning process on
the basis of what he knows, or assumes that he knows,
about what is to be learned.

While traditional verbal

learning research has generally emphasized the effects
that stimulus characteristics and presentation conditions
have on learning, the present concern is with how the subject might use knowledge about learning in general, or
knowledge about the specific to-be-learned material, to
affect subsequent encoding and retrieval.
The adult human subject brings to the learning situation numerous verbal habits and substantial knowledge
of associative relationships that have been acquired
through a history of processing verbal material.

These

habits and information undoubtedly influence what is
actually learned.

For example, research on stimulus

selection has revealed that the nominal (experimenterdefined) stimulus is not always identical to that stim. ulus the subject employs (Underwood, Ham,
1962).

& Ekstrand,

The distinction between nominal and functional

stimuli is necessary since it is apparent that the
learner may "modify" the learning situation so that
1

2
more meaningful elements of the stimulus array or more
easily associated stimuli are acquired.

Stimulus selec-

tion, therefore, is one obvious example of subjects bringing to the learning

ta~k

habits which may influence how

the to-be-learned material is encoded.
The adult learner may also change or adjust his manner of encoding on the basis of his judged progress toward
an immediate learning goal.

For example, the student who

begins reading a difficult chapter in a textbook, gets
halfway through the first page and says, "I am not understanding this.", and then begins again reading more slowly,
is exhibiting this kind of behavior.
An experiment by Woodsen (1974) provides an illustra-

tion of how subjects may let future encoding activity be
determined by successful behavior in the task.

The task

was to learn the English equivalents of 50 Japanese words
under an anticipation method of paired-associate learning.
Following one presentation of each of the 50 JapaneseEnglish word pairs, the Japanese words were divided into
five 10-item lists.

The lists remained in the subject's

view throughout the learning session which lasted approximately 2 hours.

The subject was then asked the English

equivalent of one of the Japanese words from each list,
beginning with the leftmost list and proceeding across
the five lists, with this procedure repeated constantly
throughout the session.

The subject responded to one

3

word at a time and was instructed to type his response on
a teletype joined to a computer which was programmed to
record the responses and display the correct English equivalent if the subject erred.

The manner in which the next

item was selected was the major independent variable (only
two of the six different selection procedures are particularly relevant to the present discussion).

One group was

allowed to select the next Japanese word for testing and
was given specific instructions regarding its selection.
Subjects were specifically encouraged to select from those
items which they felt they did not yet know.
was not given the opportunity to select items.

Another group
For sub-

jects in this group, the computer was programmed to display one item which had not been correctly anticipated on
two successive trials.

Subjects in these two groups per-

formed substantially better on a test of retention given
one week later than did all other subjects in the experiment (including subjects allowed to select items under
no specific instructions).

Therefore, the strategy of

allocating study time to those items which were not yet
learned, or which the subject himself judged to be not
learned, proved to be quite successful.

Since the sub-

ject himself, in at least one condition, guided the selection of "not yet known" items, this study illustrates
the subject's ability to let success under the current
learning conditions determine future encoding.

4

The ability to "know what you know" may best be viewed
as a self-regulatory process.

At some time in the learning

process, the subject will likely ask himself, "Do I know
this material well enough to remember it later?"

It is on

the basis of a negative answer that to this question that
subsequent mnemonic activity follows.

On the other hand,

if the learner answers "yes" to this question, processing
is likely to cease.

Since current theoretical emphasis is

placed on the activities of the learner (Jenkins, 1974),
such self-regulatory abilities are of increasing importance.

Tulving and Madigan (1970), for example have sug-

gested that any theory of memory must include an analysis
of the relation between the information stored in memory
and the learner's awareness of what is stored.
Judgments of Knowing.

Requiring the subject to judge

what he knows during learning, and then later testing the
veracity of these judgments, is a method of demonstrating
his capacity for self-regulation.

A judgment of knowing

(JK) can be defined as a subjectivity rated likelihood of
later retention of presently studied information.

The

time of the rating is crucial to the definition.

Since

retention tasks generally entail a study phase and a test
phase, the JK response is, by definition, made during the
study phase and before the test phase.

For the purposes

of the present discussion, both explicit and implicit JKs
will be considered.

5

One example of the use of explicit JKs in the study
of human memory is an experiment by Arbuckle and Cuddy
(1969).

Subjects learned a long series of short PA lists.

As each pair was

prese~ted

for study, the subjects were

required to respond "YES" indicating that they would get
the item correct or "NO" indicating that they would not
get the item correct.

Test trials immediately followed

the single study trials.

It was found that subjects

could accurately predict recall or non-recall at greater
chance levels.

Furthermore, an additional group of sub-

jects was asked to rate each pair on its ease or difficulty of learning.

It was found that apparent difficulty

of the pair was related to the probability of predicting
correct recall.

This was interpreted to mean that sub-

jects were assessing the strength of the associative connection between stimulus and response terms at the time
of presentation and were using this information as a basis
for the prediction.

More will be said about the use of

item characteristics as a basis for JKs later in this introduction.
A second example of the use of explicit JKs is an experiment by Zechmeister and Shaughnessy (Note 1) in which
subjects were asked to make JK ratings of individual items
during the learning of a lengthy free-recall list.

Rated

items in the study list were either once- or twice-presented items, the latter having been presented under massed or

6

distributed conditions.

Of experimental concern was the

degree to which the JK ratings matched actual recall for
both massed and distributed items.
Under such so-called MP-DP presentations, recall for
massed items is generally lower than recall for distributed items (Shaughnessy, Zimmerman,
so-called "spacing effect."

&Underwood,

1972), a

An attentional explanation of

this phenomenon says that subjects are less likely to continue processing of the second presentation of an item
under massed presentation than under distributed presentation (see Hintzman, 1974, for a review of this and other
explanations of the spacing effect).

It was suggested that

subjects shift attention because they overestimate their
memory for massed items relative to distributed items, and
differences in JK ratings would reflect this perceived difference in the judged likelihood of recall.
The results of the Zechmeister and Shaughnessy study
indicated that subjects could make JK ratings with some
degree of accuracy.

Once-presented items were rated lower

(less likelihood of recall) than twice-presented items,
and recall was, in fact, lower for once- than twice-presented items.

Furthermore, the hypothesis regarding the

ratings of massed versus distributed items was upheld in
that, although massed items were recalled significantly
less than distributed items, massed items received ratings
similar to distributed items.

This suggests that the
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subjects might have been "misled" by the presentation conditions, and the attentional explanation of the spacing
effect was supported.
A JK is a request for an assessment of how successfully an item has been stored in memory.

It is assumed

that one purpose such a judgment might serve during learning is that processing time may be allocated to items on
the basis of this judgment.

Experimental paradigms which

allow the assessment of the subject's distribution of attention can be viewed, therefore, as examples of implicit
judgments regarding the memory for an item.
A common finding is that the number of items learned
during a certain interval is invariant regardless of the
distribution of presentation times within the interval
(Cooper

&Pantle,

1967).

Zacks (1969) was interested in

testing the generality of this law of "total time invariance" when subjects were given increased control over
presentation and testing conditions during the learning
of two lists of paired associates.

That is, study time

was either free (subject-paced) or constrained (experimenter-paced), and the order of study and test trials was
either free (subject-controlled) or constrained (experimenter controlled).

Conditions for the learning of the

first list represented a factorial combination of these
two factors.

The second list was learned under one of

two conditions; either constrained study time and
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ordering of study and test trials, or free study time and
ordering of study of test trials.
groups in the experiment.

Thus there were eight

Learning was to a criterion of

one perfect trial.
Some of the results reported by Zacks are especially
important to the present discussion.

In a paired-associate

list, one would not expect all items to be of equal difficulty, and thus subjects might spend more time on items
perceived as difficult.

To test this notion, for each sub-

ject Zacks ranked the items according to performance across
all learning trials (ranking was from fewest to most errors).
Similarly, the study times for each of the items were ranked
for each subject.

A positive rank-order correlation would

indicate that more time was spent on difficult than easy
items.

For List 1 learning, the average median correlation

across all groups was .66, for List 2, .72.

Thus the sub-

jects were appropriately allowing more study time to difficult items; and furthermore, with experience at the task,
there was a slightly stronger relationship between time and
item difficulty.
One would also expect that for a given pair, study time
would be longer if an error was committed on the previous
attempt than if the previous test was successful.

Indeed,

Zacks reported that the mean study time following an error
was twice as long as that following a correct response.

9

One cannot claim that these findings

unambi~uously

demonstrate that subjects were making implicit JKs.
ever, a relationship is suggested.

How-

That is, it appeared

that subjects were allocating study time "as if" they were
asking themselves whether or not they knew a pair well
enough.

This is an assumption which is important to later

discussion.
Zacks employed a transfer paradigm to examine whether
subjects under self-paced conditions learned specific
"skills" which would aid future learning.

Since self-paced

and experimenter-paced presentations led to equal rates of
learning on List 1, the groups were equivalent and the
appropriate comparisons could be made.

She reported that

groups who had learned List 1 under self-paced conditions
learned List 2 faster than subjects who had learned List 1
under experimenter-paced conditions.

This suggests that

subjects who were allowed to control their study time
acquired skills which other subjects did not.

Furthermore,

the beneficial effects of learning List l under self-paced
conditions were apparent even though second list learning
was experimenter paced.
Since the assumption was made above that the process
of self-pacing of study· items is related to implicit JKs,
these latter findings concerning positive transfer suggest
an interesting question:

can the performance of implicit

JKs be similarly regarded as a "skill" which could facilitate

10
learning in subsequent tasks?

That is, could successful

learning based on correct implicit JKs be one of the many
skills associated with learning-to-learn (cf. Postman,
1969)?

The relationship between JKs and learning-to-learn

is important for the present discussion.
Information which contributes to a JK.

Several sources

of information which aid the subject in making a JK can be
suggested.

One obvious source is item characteristics.

For example, if a subject were shown a list of high-frequency words and a list of low-frequency words and was
asked which would be easier to learn, he would probably
select the high-frequency list.

Through experience, cer-

tain item characteristics have become associated with
"ease" or "difficulty" of learning.

In a JK task, stim-

ulus knowledge, or a knowledge of item characteristics,
will likely influence the subject's judgment.

Although,

it must be pointed out that JKs need not depend on stimulus characteristics.

If an item is learned sufficiently,

that item's background frequency should

not~

se affect

a JK.
The understanding of task demands may also influence
a JK.

If the above example were changed such that the

subject were asked which list was easier to recognize, he
should give the opposite response since it has been shown
that low-frequency words are more easily recognized than
high-frequency words (Underwood

&Freund,

1970).

An
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understanding of task demands in general, or how item characteristics can interact with task demands, will be called
process knowledge.

Thus in a JK task, an awareness of how

the material will be tested may affect the JK response.
Other examples of process knowledge would include an understanding of retro- and pro-active interference.

That is,

if a to-be-judged item was very similar to one studied in
a previous list, the JK may be influenced if the subject
has some understanding of proactive interference.
A JK may also be influenced by implicit retrieval
attempts.

For example, during paired-associate learning,

the subject may try to retrieve the mediator he had employed for that item before making his JK rating.

If the

task involved JKs after reading textual material, the subject may attempt to retrieve the "gist" of the sentences
or paragraphs, and the success of these implicit retrieval
attempts may affect the JK response.'
Therefore, three major sources of information for a
JK are:

(a) stimulus knowledge, (b) process knowledge,

and (c) implicit retrieval.

The importance of each of

these sources is likely to vary from task to task.

For

example, if homogeneous lists are used, differences in
item characteristics would be minimal, and perhaps, process knowledge would be a major determinant of the JK response.

However, it is suggested that across a variety
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of laboratory tasks, the validity of these sources of information may be demonstrated.
Stimulus Knowledge
Subjects apparently know what characteristics of a
stimulus are important in determining learning ease.

Many

types of items (words, nonsense syllables, consonant syllables) have been scaled for meaningfulness or association
value.

Richardson and Erlebacher (1958) examined the re-

lationship between rated ease of learning and degree of
associative connection between pairs of verbal items.
Subjects were given a sample paired-associate list followed by a list of pairs of adjectives, nonsense syllables,
or consonant syllables.

Some subjects were asked to imag-

ine that each pair were inserted in the sample list and
then to rate the ease-of-learning each for pair as if it
were a member of the sample list.

Other subjects were

asked to rate the associative connection between members
of the pairs as compared to pairs in the sample list.
Very high correlations between rated ease-of-learning (EL)
and meaningfulness of the pairs were obtained.
In a more extensive analysis, Underwood (1966) demonstrated that subjects are capable of accurately judging
the ease or difficulty of an item prior to actual learning
of the item.

He first instructed subjects to imagine that

they were in a free-recall experiment and then presented a
list of trigrams.

Subjects were to make judgments of the
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speed with which they thought they would learn
the imagined task.

~ach

item in

Following this, an incidental recall

trail was given and then six actual study-test learning
trials.

Other groups of subjects simply learned the items

or made pronunciability or meaningfulness ratings for the
items.
Underwood correlated the ease-of-learning judgments
with a measure of item recall.

The results of the Under-

wood study and some of the problems identified with this
type of research are relevant to the present discussion.
Mean EL ratings obtained from the group of subjects
correlated highly (.96) with the mean number of times each
item was correctly recalled across the six learning trials.
However, one source of criticism of this correlational
technique is that the requirement of EL judgments could
produce a "bias."

That is, subjects might have produced

recall protocols which "matched" the ratings.

An item

judged as difficult before learning might have been treated
differently during learning simply because it had received
a "difficult" rating.

Nevertheless, Underwood showed that

the correlation between EL and learning measures taken
from the same group was not higher than that obtained when
EL ratings from one group were correlated with the learning
scores of a group that did not make EL ratings.

Thus, one

can conclude that the relationship between EL and recall
was reliable.
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An additional concern of the Underwood study was whether an individual subject's EL ratings would predict his own
learning.

The correlation between an item's EL rating and

the number of correct recalls across six learning trials
was computed for each subject.
correlations was .48.

The mean of the individual

Thus, subjects were able to predict

their own learning of the trigrams with a substantial degree of accuracy.

However, these correlations were sub-

stantially lower than the correlations between group EL
and group learning.

Also, Underwood reported that group

EL scale values predicted group learning better than individual subject's EL ratings predicted group learning.
The difference in the relationships between individual ratings and learning and group EL ratings and learning
suggests that across a group of subjects, a greater number
of item characteristics which determine learning ease of
difficulty are likely to be taken into account.

This sug-

gests that an EL value is more valid if it represents a
summation of perceived characteristics which determine
learning ease across a group of individuals (for example,
EL values could be seen as analogous to an item's association value which is usually determined by a group of subjects). Underwood suggested that the reliability of an
individual's ratings should be examined.

Since, in Under-

wood's experiment, individual EL-learning correlations
were determined on the basis of one observation which was

15

subject to error of measurement; the individual ·correlations
may approach the magnitude of the group correlation if several EL ratings were made for each item.
It is also possible that an EL rating may contain idiosyncratic factors.

That is, a subject may judge an item

as easy to learn because of some idiosyncratic association
or because of some personal familiarity with an item.

In

order to test this, Underwood, randomly repaired each subject's EL ratings with another subject's recall scores.
With this repairing, the EL-learning correlations tended
to decrease, and this is exactly what one would expect if
the EL scale was, in fact, reflecting a specific individual's perception of an item.
In Underwood's analysis, individual differences in
learning may also have affected the correlations.

That

is, for rapid learners a greater number of items would be
recalled on all six trials, and a low correlation would
result because of the attenuation in the range of possible
learning scores.

Underwood, therefore, ordered the sub-

jects into six groups according to learning ability.

As

learning ability increased the mean correlations tended
to decrease.

This finding could suggest that fast learners

were simply poor raters of EL.

However, this is unlikely

since for the fast learners, EL ratings correlated highly
with the group recall scores.

Therefore, it must be con-

cluded that the decline in the correlations for the fast
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learners resulted from a statistical rather than· a conceptual problem.
One additional concern with the Underwood experiment
is that artificially high correlations could have resulted
because of the wide range of item types employed.

The

study list contained both high-meaningful three-letter
words and low-meaningful consonant-consonant-consonant
trigrams.

Such a "mixed" list may have artifically drawn

attention to item characteristics that are related to
learning ease.

Nevertheless, Lippman and Kintz (1968)

replicated Underwood's findings even though a more homogeneous list of items was used (all

eve

trigrams).

The important conclusion from the research cited
above is that even before specific instructions to learn
the items, subjects can accurately "predict" their learning of these items.

It is assumed that this is done by

attending to those item characteristics which determine
learning ease.

Stimulus knowledge is likely to be ac-

quired through learning experience with a variety of
items.

The assumption that stimulus knowledge is acquired

through learning tasks suggests a close relationship between stimulus knowledge and process knowledge.

This re-

lationship will be considered in the next section.
Process Knowledge
A second general source of information that is available for the performance of a JK can be called process
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knowledge.

This term is meant to refer to a general un-

derstanding of the "laws" of learning and a knowledge of
specific task demands.

For example, a student, upon be-

ing told of a forthcoming examination, will invariably
ask whether the test will be an essay test or a multiplechoice test.

This implies that the type of test will de-

termine how the student studies for the exam.

The student

appears to have an implicit understanding of the difference
between a recall test and a recognition test.
depend on the expected manner of testing.

A JK may

Similarly, stu-

dents may decide whether or not they have adequately prepared for a test on the basis of how successful certain
study habits have been in the past.

A student who has

always read the textbook three times and

outlined the

material before a test and who has been consistently reinforced with acceptable grades, is likely to say, "I
read the material three times therefore I know it well
enough to do well on the exam."

Through experience,

individuals develop general learning skills or study
habits which can be applied to a variety of learning
situations.
Development of Process Knowledge--Metamemory.

The

development of process knowledge actually begins with an
understanding of what "remember" means.

Flavell (1971)

and Hagen (1971) have noted that very young children may
equate remembering with repetition and that processes
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such as meditation or rehearsal are not performed effectively by young children.
In addition to the development of memory performance,
the development of knowledge about one's memory has recently been investigated by Flavell and his associates
(Flavell

&Wellman,

in press).

This knowledge about mem-

ory has been termed "metamemory."

Kruetzer, Leonard, and

Flavell (1975) interviewed young children to access the
degree to which they understood their own memory capabilities.

Children were asked, for example, "Suppose you

looked up your friend's telephone number.

If your brother

asked you a question just before you begin to dial, do you
think you would be able to remember the number?"

Answers

to this question suggested that children possess an implicit understanding of the concept of interference in immediate memory.

From this and similar questions, the authors

concluded that children show clear evidence of comprehending basic "laws" of human memory.
The understanding of immediate memory span was specifically tested by Flavell, Fredricks, and Hoyt (1970).

Nur-

sery school, kindergarten, second- and fourth-grade children were asked to predict their own memory span.

They

were shown a series of pictures of increasing lengths, and
the maximum number of items the children thought they could
remember was recorded.

When these predictions were compared

with actual recall, it was found that, while all children
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tended to overestimate their memory capacity,

th~

degree

of overprediction dropped with age.
Yussen and Levy (1975) pointed to a possible methodological flaw in the Flavell et al. study and extended
the investigation to include adult subjects.

Yussen and

Levy questioned the use of two demonstration trials (lengths
of one and two items) on which nearly all Flavell's subjects
were successful.

These trials could have led to an unwar-

ranted expectancy for success.

To control for this bias,

they presented stimulus arrays in decreasing as well as
increasing order of difficulty.

Furthermore, normative

information was given to the subjects.

That is, they were

told "your friends can remember this many," when the series of appropriate length was presented.

For all subjects

(ages 4, 8, and 20 years) the tendency to over-predict was
observed, but accuracy of prediction for all but the youngest subjects increased when normative information was given.
Apparently, 4 year olds were uninfluenced by knowledge of
their peer group's performance.

It is interesting to note

that adults were quite accurate in predicting their immediate memory span.

The mean predicted recall was 5.83 items,

and the mean actual recall was 5.52 items.
In addition to an understanding of one's general memory capacity, the awareness of certain "rules" of memory
performance is important in the development of process
knowledge.

Moynahan (1973) examined first-, second- and
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third-graders' awareness of the ease of recalling conceptually related items as opposed to unrelated items.

Sub-

jects were shown two cards, one containing eight unrelated
items and one containing eight categorized items (four instances of two categories).

Subjects were then asked to

select that card which would be easier to remember.

First-

graders were less likely to select the categorized card
than were third- or fifth-graders, yet the first-graders
selected the categorized card more often than would be
expected by chance.

Thus, even first-graders showed some

understanding of the facilitory effects of categorization
on recall.
In an earlier part of this paper, the differential
apportionment of study time to items within a list was
assumed to be related to the JK process (cf. Zacks, 1969).
Masur, Mcintyre, and Flavell (1973) extended Zack's findings to include first- and third-graders as well as college-age subjects.

The task was to learn a list of items

which was 50% longer than each subject's memory span.

Af-

ter presentation of the list for 45 seconds, recall was
tested.

On subsequent trials, each subject was told that

he could study only one half of the items and he was to
indicate which items he wanted to study.

However, as the

subject's learning approached criterion (one perfect recitation) new items were added to the list prior to the subject's selection of study items.
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In order to determine if the selection of study items
was affected by the success of previous recall attempts,
the proportion of items not recalled on the previous trial
that were selected for 'study was computed for each subject.
The proportions for first-graders were significantly less
than for the other groups of subjects.

In post-experimen-

tal interviews, none of the first-graders reported conscious selection of previously missed items.

It was not

likely that first-graders failed to understand the task
since they, like the older subjects, tended to select
"new" items which were added to the study list on the
final trials.

Furthermore, it was unlikely that first-

graders failed to remember what they had recalled on previous attempts.

Masur et al. retested eight subjects,

and before study trials began, they asked subjects to
indicate which items they had just recalled.

Subjects

were extremely accurate at this recognition task.

The

authors suggested that while the adults might have tried
to remember all the items, younger subjects might have
spent most of their effort on remembering those items
which had been selected for study.

Thus for the younger

students, the strategy of allocating additional study
time to unlearned items would not have been appropriate
for the task as they perceived it.

Masur et al. conclud-

ed that this strategy was probably absent from the young
children's repertoire of study behaviors.
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From the above research, two general conclusions regarding the development of process knowledge can be stated.
First, even young children exhibit an awareness of the general "laws" of memory and are aware of the capacities of
their memories.

Secondly, metamemory and memory perform-

ance seem to develop in parallel.

This suggests a rather

strong relationship between process knowledge and learning
ability.
Process knowledge:

knowledge of task demands.

A sub-

ject who differentially encodes verbal material on the basis of the type of test he expects is exhibiting process
knowledge.

Gude and Zechmeister (Note 2) reported that

subjects anticipating a recognition test showed poorer
recall than subjects expecting a recall test.

They sug-

gested that this effect was due to the reduced level of
attention subjects found necessary to produce efficient
performance on a previous recognitirin task.
Kellas, McCaully and McFarland (1975) also demonstrated that subjects employ task-specific skills during
encoding.

Subjects were given successive 15-item lists

for either serial learning or free recall learning.

Pre-

sentation was self-paced and thus the distribution of
study times for serial and free recall learning could be
examined.

Under serial learning instructions, a direct

linear relationship between study-time and serial position was observed.

This suggests that rehearsal of items
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was cumulative.
less systematic.

For free-recall, this relationship was
This difference suggests that the per-

ception of task demands led to different encoding behavior.
It can be suggested that the subject's perception
of the appropriateness of the encoding of an item might
influence his JK response.

This would require process

knowledge.
Process knowledge--"Mis-judgments" of knowing.

Er-

roneously perceived task demands can lead to what may be
called implicit "misjudgments" of knowing.

As was dis-

cussed above, Zechmeister and Shaughnessy (Note 1) suggested that the spacing effect could be related to the
subject's mis-perception of task demands.

The attention-

al explanation of the spacing effect is somewhat dependent on the subject's misjudgment of what is necessary
for successful retention of massed items.
It is likely that other memory phenomena can be explained on the basis of erroneous implicit JKs.

Craik

(1970) and McCabe and Madigan (1970) have reported that
if a subject is presented with a series of short free
recall lists, terminal items will be recalled almost perfectly on an immediate test, but on a delayed final test
given after the series of short lists, these terminal
items will be recalled very poorly.

This recall decre-

ment has been called the "negative recency effect."

24

Light (1974) encouraged subjects to increase rehearsal of
terminal items and informed subjects. that they would be
given a final test.

Even with this clarification of task

demands, the negative recency effect was still obtained.
She suggested that terminal items were rehearsed in a different manner than other items.

That is, terminal items

were rehearsed in a manner that merely maintained the
items, whereas other list items were given more "elaborate"
rehearsals (cf. Craik, 1973).

Thus subjects were misjudg-

ing what was necessary to assure retention of terminal
items.

Watkins and Watkins (1974) found that when sub-

jects were given a series of lists of varying lengths,
and thus could not know when the end of the list was
approaching, the negative recency effect vanished.

There-

fore, under these conditions, it can be assumed that subjects did not treat terminal items differentially.

The

subjects were "prevented" from making a misjudgment of
knowing at the time of encoding, and this apparently increased retention.
These examples suggest that with learning experience,
it is likely that "inappropriate" as well as appropriate
learning strategies can be acquired.

Therefore, part of

what is called process knowledge is the knowledge of the
relationship between task demands and appropriate encoding
processes.
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Implicit Retrieval
In addition to stimulus knowledge and process knowledge, a JK may also depend on a direct examination of the
contents of memory, that is, implicit retrieval.

Accord-

ing to the definition of JKs stated earlier in this paper,
a JK response is made during the study phase of a learning
task.

Therefore, a pre-test phase retrieval attempt is

assumed to be made without the benefit of explicit retrieval attempts (or test trials).
An obvious way to decide if you are going to be able

to remember certain information at a later time is to try
to retrieve that information.

If this attempt is success-

ful, attention may be directed to less well-established
information.

For example, if a JK is required during

paired-associate learning, the subject may attempt to
retrieve the mediator he had employed for that pair on
earlier trials.

In free recall, the subject may review

associative connections between list items or rehearse
retrieval strategies when making a JK.

If these retrieval

attempts are successful, the subject may rate an item as
likely to be remembered.
However, it must be noted that a delayed test may
render information gained from an implicit retrieval attempt invalid.

That is, in paired-associate learning, a

subject may successfully retrieve the mediator for a list
pair and make a JK response.

.

'

However, during the retention
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interval, forgetting of the mediator may be just as likely
as forgetting of the response term. · Thus the JK would
become less reliable if no other relevant sources of information were available to the subject.
As was mentioned earlier, a JK may be seen as a selfregulatory process.

The assumed purpose of a JK is to

allow processing time to be allocated in the most efficient
manner.

That is, distinguishing between "known" and "un-

known" material will allow extra attention to be given to
unknown material.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out

that the JK response for an item may be made relative to
the degree to which other to-be-learned material is successful encoded.

Thus it is possible that during an im-

plicit retrieval attempt, complete retrieval of information may indicate to the subject that the material is
well-established and that further processing would be unnecessary.

However, a partially successful retrieval at-

tempt may indicate the degree to which further processing
is necessary.

A partially successful retrieval attempt

tells the subject that information is not completely absent from memory and that with additional study time,
that information may easily become well-established.
Therefore, information gained from partial retrieval
may be helpful to the subject who is making a JK response.
Two rather common memory phenomena which have been related
to partial retrieval will now be considered.
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Relationship between JK and Tip-of-the-Tongue Phenomena.

The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT). phenomenon was empir-

ically demonstrated by Brown and McNeil! (1966).

Subjects

were presented with the definition of an uncommon English
word and were then asked to supply the word.

If the sub-

ject could not recall the word but indicated a TOT state,
he was asked what he knew about the target word.

If an

items was not retrieved, information such as the first
letter, number of syllables, letters in various positions,
syllabic stress, and suffixes could often be accurately
reported.

It appeared as though the greater the number

of attributes recalled, the greater the likelihood of
eventual successful retrieval of the target word.
Koriat and Lieblich (1974) improved the analysis of
TOT states by accounting for guessing rates.

For example,

if you are searching for the name of a chemical element,
you are more likely to report that the target word has
four syllables than one syllable based on your general
knowledge of chemical terminology.

This more analytic

approach led them to suggest that both knowledge about
the class of items to which the target word belongs (class
detection) and the retrieval of information specific to
the target word (differential detection) can result in a
TOT experience.
Recently Yarmey (1974) studied the TOT phenomenon in
relation to non-verbal information.

Subjects were shown
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pictures of famous people and were required to supply
their names.

In a manner similar to the Brown and McNeill

study, subjects reporting a TOT state were asked to indicate the occupation of .the target person, the places where
the target person would most often be seen, and how recently the target person had been encountered.

Orthograph-

ic and phonetic information about the target person's name
was also requested.

Yarmey found that initial letters,

number of syllables, and sound of the target name were not
as frequently supplied as were reports of the target person's profession, or the place or time of recent encounter
with the person.

Thus while Brown and McNeil demonstrated

that subjects in a TOT state could accurately report verbal
information, Yarmey showed that spatial-temporal or nonverbal information may also be retrieved in a TOT situation.
A very similar memory phenomenon, called the "Feelingof-Knowing" experience (FK), occurs when one reports that
unrecallable information is recognizable.

Hart (1965,

1966, 1967) has extensively analyzed this phenomenon, and
since the methods and analyzes he employed are similar to
those which will be employed in the present experiment,
these studies will be considered in detail.
Hart exploited the well-established fact that recognition is generally better than recall.
cedure was as follows.

The general pro-

Subjects were given general
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information questions that had only a single

For

ans~er.

each question that could not be answered, subjects were
told to make a yes-no judgment as to whether the correct
answer could be selected from several alternatives.

Fol-

lowing completion of this task, multiple-alternative
recognition tests were given.

The technique has been

called the recall-judgment-recognition (RJR) paradigm.
An accurate FK judgment could represent one of two
cases.

When a subject said he knew the answer (YES judg-

ment) and, in fact, he could select it from the alternatives on the recognition test, the response was called
a FK hit..

Likewise, when the subject reported that he

could not recognize the answer (NO judgment) and, in
fact, could not select the correct alternative on the
recognition test, the response was called a Feeling-ofNOT-knowing hit (FK hit).

A FK miss and a FK miss rep-

resent instances in which the judgments did not match
the subsequent recognition performance.

To test the

accuracy of FK judgments, recognition of items the subject "felt he knew" should be compared with recognition
of items the subject "felt he did not know"; that is,
FK hits versus FK misses.
Hart (1965) found that more non-recalled items given
a YES FK rating were recognized than items given a NO FK
rating.

While this indicated that accurate judgments can

be made about what is in storage, judgments of what is
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not in memory were found to be less accurate than would
be expected.

It was found that 43% of the items subjects

judged as not in memory were nevertheless subsequently
correctly recognized. ·Hart (1966) reduced this FK miss
rate by providing more equally-likely alternatives on the
recognition test and by including a six-point rating scale
rather than the yes-no dichotomy for FK judgments.

The FK

miss rates was reduced but did not vanish under these more
sensitive conditions.
Hart (1966) also improved the RJR technique by requiring subjects to guess on every recall attempt, since
subjects who withheld retrieved information could have
effectively inflated the FK accuracy scores.

That is, if

a subject remembered that he had earlier judged an item
to be unknown, he could increase the accuracy of his FK
responses by simply withholding the correct response (in
this case, the FK

miss rate would remain low, thereby

increasing the difference between FK hits and FK misses).
The guessing requirement tended to reduce the relative
magnitude of FK hits to PK misses; however, Hart concluded
that the FK experience was still demonstrated.
In a later experiment, Hart (1967) employed the RJR
paradigm with word-trigram paired-associates.

After one,

two, or three study trials, a recall test was presented.
A response was demanded for each stimulus on the test
list, and if the subject believed he was responding
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correctly, he was to circle the response.

For ill uncir-

cled items, the subject was to make a FK judgment.

Three

learning trials produced a greater difference between FK
hits and FK misses than did one or two trials.

(Both FK

'

hits and FK misses increased as the number of study trials
increased, but the former increased at a faster rate than
the latter.)
Perhaps a weakness in Hart's research concerns the
problem of criterion differences across subjects.

That

is, some subjects may be more cautious in predicting later
recognition than others, and given some method of measuring
criterion, the accuracy of FK judgments might be shown to
increase.

(See Murdock, 1966, for a discussion of criter-

ion problems in memory tasks.)
In general, it is important to consider information
available to the subject which tells him that to-be-learned
material is not yet learned.

This information can be seen

as just as important to the subject as is information which
leads him to believe that the material is already learned.
Therefore, under certain conditions, the TOT experience
and the FK experience could be related to the performance
of a JK.
JKs and Learning to Learn
As was mentioned earlier in this paper, the capacity
to make JKs is related to the notion of learning-to-learn
in that JKs may represent a skill which can be applied
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across a variety of learning situations.

The present ex-

periment is directly aimed at the question of JKs as a
learnable skill.
In research in human learning, transfer effects have
been traditionally divided into two classes:
and non-specific transfer.

specific

The present experimenter deals

with one aspect of so-called non-specific transfer, learning to learn.

Non-specific transfer effects are assumed

to be independent of any purposeful similarity of the
to-be-learned material across a series of tasks.

Specific

transfer effects, on the other hand, are traditionally
seen as dependent on planned relationships between items
on successive lists to be learned.
The above classification of transfer effects has recently been challenged.

In an extensive analysis of

learning-to-learn, Postman (1969) has presented the view
that no clear discontinuity between specific and non-specific transfer can be postulated.

That is, types of trans-

fer are seen as lying along a continuum of applicability.
Transfer represents a "carrying over" of an acquired habit
or skill from the learning of one list to the learning of
another.

Some skills are more generally applicable than

others.
The effects of learning-to-learn can be demonstrated
by the learning of two lists which reflect no systematic
relationship or similarity between

r
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the two lists (e.g., A-B, C-D).

During learning of the

first list, response integration skills (among others)
may be acquired which facilitate learning of the second
list.

For example, if. List 1 contains low-meaningful

trigrams as response terms, then learning experience with
these items will facilitate second list learning to a
greater extent than if List 1 was comprised of readily
available high meaningful words (Postman, Keppel
1968).

A skill was acquired.

& Zacks,

This skill was the effi-

cient processing of low-meaningful items.
Othe~

conditions of paired-associate learning may

lead to the acquisition of higher order "rules" for learning lists of a specific structure.

Postman (1969) suggests

that rules of inclusion and exclusion are employed to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses.

For

example, in the specific transfer paradigm, A-B, C-B,
response terms are identical on the two successive lists,
but the stimuli differ.

This paradigm requires the use

of the rule of inclusion, or the use of "old" response
terms.

Furthermore, the use of these rules can be learned

across a series of pairs of lists.

That is, employment

of the rules can result from learning-to-learn (Postman,
1964).
Postman (1969) concludes that such skills as response
integration, method of practice (serial vs. paired associate learning), and higher order rules of response

34

selection may be included under the classificatibn of
learning-to-learn.
LaPorte and Voss (1974a) furthered the analysis of
learning-to-learn effects by independently manipulating
(1) the number of lists learned before the critical trans-

fer list, and (2) the criterion of learning each list.
Thus, the number of associations to be learned could be
held constant while the criterion differed.

Learning four

eight-item lists to a 50% criterion requires the same number of associations as does the learning of two eight-item
lists to a 100% criterion.

Some of the results reported

by LaPorte and Voss are especially relevant to the present
discussion.

They found that if a constant number of asso-

ciations were required for pre-critical list learning,
positive non-specific transfer was more likely to result
if the initial lists were learned to a 100% criterion than
if the initial lists were learned to a 50% criterion.
Thus it appeared that, in certain situations, one aspect
of positive transfer is the ability to process unlearned
pairs when part of the list has already been learned.

A

"mastery" of the list requires the subject to discriminate
the pairs that have been learned from the pairs that have
not been learned and then to allocate processing efforts
accordingly.
In a related study of paired-associate learning,
LaPorte and Voss (1974b) substituted a computational
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filler task in place of test trials.

Groups were given 5,

10, 20, or 40 such non-test trials and then were required
to learn the list under normal study-test conditions to a
criterion of one perfett trial.

A control group was given

only the normal study-test learning trials.

Performance

of the first test trial by the groups who received no
initial test trials was compared to the number of studytest trials which was necessary for the control group to
reach an equal degree of learning.

The control group re-

quired about half as many trials to reach the level of
performance of the groups who were not previously tested.
The authors concluded that in the testing conditions,
valuable "feedback" information was available to the subject.

This feedback allows the subjects to determine

which pairs are learned and which pairs require further
processing.

If testing were absent, it would become more

difficult for subjects to discriminate between known and
unknown pairs.

Also, when test trials are removed, the

subjects' rehearsal may be unrelated to the degree to
which an item is successfully stored in memory.

LaPorte,

Voss, and Bisanz (1974) attempted to extend these findings
to a transfer paradigm.

However, no evidence was obtained

which suggested that elimination of test trials during the
learning of List 1 produced a detriment in the second list
learning.

In the present experiment, the role of test

trials in the JK process will be examined.

THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT
The present experiment was designed to answer the
following questions.

First, under paired-associate (PA)

learning conditions, to what extent do JKs depend on
knowledge of previous test trial performance?

Second,

does JK accuracy improve as familiarity with specific
task demands increases?

Third, does JK experience lead

to the development of learning "skills" which can be employed when conditions of learning change?
A learning-to-learn paradigm was employed.

Four

groups of subjects learned three different PA lists, and
t\·:o critical aspects of the learning procedure comprised
the independent variables.
Differences in the learning procedure during the
first two lists defined the first independent variable.
One half the subjects learned the pairs under an alternating study-test trial procedure (STUDY-TEST groups);
while, for the other two groups, intervening test trials
were omitted and a single test trial was given for each
·list (STUDY-ONLY groups).

On the third list, all sub-

jects learned the pairs under the STUDY-ONLY conditions.
A second important aspect of the procedure involved
the presence or absence of a JK rating trial after each
36
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PA list.

Two of the groups were shown the pairs· after

learning and were asked to make JKs (JK groups).

For the

remaining two groups, no JKs were required for the first
two lists, and subjects were given an additional study
trial (CONTROL groups).

For the third list (STUDY-ONLY),

all subjects were asked to make JK ratings after learning
and before the test trial.
Therefore, four groups, representing a factorial combination of the two independent variables (STUDY-TEST vs.
STUDY-ONLY, and JK vs. CONTROL) were employed.

These

groups will be referred to as STUDY-TEST-JK, STUDY-TESTCONTROL, STUDY-ONLY-JK, and STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL.
of the procedure is contained in Table 1.

A diagram

Both the im-

provement in JK accuracy across the first two lists and
the level of accuracy on the third list were of interest.
Regarding the major purposes of the present experiment, the following hypotheses can be stated.
First, since subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group
will have knowledge of test trial performance available
to them while the subjects in the STUDY-ONLY-JK group
will not, JK accuracy will be greater for the former
group than for the latter group on the first list.
Second, since subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK and
STUDY-ONLY-JK groups will gain experience with task
demands across the first two lists, both these groups
will show improvement in JK accuracy.

Since the

Table 1
Schematic Diagram of the Procedure
Lists 1

Group

&2

List 3

A.

STUDY-TEST-JK

S-T, S-T, S-T

JK

TEST

B.

STUDY-ONLY-JK

S, S,

JK

TEST

c.

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

S-T, S-T, S-T

TEST

D.

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

S, S, S, S, S

s
s

-S,

S, S

TEST

s'
s'
s'
s'

s'
s'
s'
s'

s
s
s
s

JK

TEST

JK

TEST

JK

TEST

JK

TEST

S-T - PA study and test trial
S

- study trial only

JK

- Judgment of Knowing trial

VI

co
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STUDY-TEST-JK group should have more information· relevant
to a JK available, this group should improve at a faster
rate than the STUDY-ONLY-JK group across the first two
lists.
Third, the STUDY-TEST-JK group should show a decrease
in JK accuracy on List 3 when intervening test trials are
removed.

That is, for this group, conditions of learning

were changed such that knowledge of test trial performance
would not be available.

If this information was crucial

for the STUDY-TEST-JK group's JK performance on the first
two lists, then JKs should be less accurate on List 3.
The fourth hypothesis states that subjects in the
STUDY-ONLY-JK group will exhibit continued improvement in
JK accuracy across all three lists.

This would indicate

that subjects learned to make JKs on knowledge other than
that provided by test trials.
The fifth hypothesis concerns JK accuracy on the third
list.

The STUDY-TEST-JK group will show greater JK accura-

cy than the STUDY-TEST-CONTROL group since the f0rmer group
will have had experience with the JK task while the latter
group will not have had this experience.

Similarly, the

STUDY-ONLY-JK group will show greater JK accuracy than the
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group on the third list.
A secondary issue which was investigated concerned the
effect on recall of making JKs.

That is, does the require-

ment of making JKs lead the subject to more efficient

40

processing than when no JK requirement is present and the
subject is left to his own devices?

Within the STUDY-TEST

groups, it is expected that those subjects making JKs will
recall more items than· those subjects not making JKs.

Sim-

ilarly for the STUDY-ONLY groups, the STUDY-ONLY-JK group
will show greater recall than the STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group.

METHOD
Design.
of 24 PAs.

Four groups of subjects learned three lists
Two groups learned the first two lists under

an alternating study-test trial procedure (STUDY-TEST
groups).

The other two groups learned the first two lists

with no test trials intervening between study trials and
only a single test trial following several study trials
(STUDY-ONLY groups).

Within the STUDY-TEST groups, one

group was asked to make JK ratings before the last test
trial (STUDY-TEST-JK).

The other STUDY-TEST group re-

ceived an additional study trial in place of the JK rating
trial (STUDY-TEST-CONTROL).

Similarly for the STUDY-ONLY

groups, one group received a JK trial before the single
test trial (STUDY-ONLY-JK), while the other group received an additional study trial (STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL).
For the third list, all groups learned under the STUDYONLY conditions, and all groups made JK ratings before
the single test trial.

Therefore, the four groups were

distinguished by the learning procedure and by the pres· ence or absence of the JK rating trial on each of the
first two lists.
Materials.
structed.

Three 24-item lists of PAs were con-

From the Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968)
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norms, all two-syllable words were selected with frequencies between 1 and 50 per million (Thorndike

& Lorge,

1944).

The words in this pool were ranked on imagery value, and
the 72 items with the lowest imagery values were selected
for use as response terms;

These items were randomly di-

vided into three sets of 24.

Stimulus terms were 72 eve

trigrams randomly selected from Noble's (1961) norms.
Stimuli ranged in association value from 70% to 78%.
From the pool of 72 eves, items were randomly divided
into three sets of 24 items with the qualification that,
within an item set, no two trigrams could have the first
two letters in common.

Stimulus and response item sets

were paired, and the 24 eves and two-syllable words within a set were randomly paired to form three lists of 24
PAs.

Stimulus-response pairs were typed on index cards

for study trial presentation.
In order to prevent serial position from serving as
a cue in PA learning, on each study trial, subjects received a different order of study items.

To construct

different orders, each of the three study lists was considered as four blocks of six items.

Items within a block

were randomly rearranged on each trial.

Also, the order

of the blocks was random on each trial.

Furthermore, the

order of item presentation for rating and test trials was
different than that for study trials.
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Study, rating, and test lists were constructed such
that the interval between studying and rating an item and
the interval between rating and testing an item would be
controlled.

For this teason, all lists were divided into

blocks of items, and membership in a block was systematically controlled.

Study lists were arranged into four

blocks of six items.

Rating lists included six blocks

of four items, and each block was composed of one item
randomly selected from each of the four study list blocks.
Using this procedure, two different orders of list items
were constructed to be used for JK ratings for each item
set.

Test lists were also divided into four blocks of

six items.

Each test block contained one item randomly

selected from each rating list block.

Subjects in the

STUDY-TEST groups received several test trials over each
item set, and in order to prevent repeated exposure to
the same order of test items, three different orders of
test items were constructed using the same procedure.
The rating and test lists were printed on half sheets
of paper and inserted in envelopes such that only one item
could be exposed at a time.
Pilot Study.

A pilot study was conducted in order to

determine the necessary number of learning trials to reach
a criterion of approximately 50% for each of the conditions
of the present experiment.

Using the same materials as de-

scribed above, subjects in one pilot group were required
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to learn the PAs under STUDY-TEST conditions, and subjects
in a second pilot group learned the PAs under STUDY-ONLY
instructions.

A 50% criterion was attained after three

trials for the STUDY-TEST pilot group and after five trials
for the STUDY-ONLY pilot group.
3 second rate.

Items were presented at a

Hence, these parameters were used in the

present experiment.
JK Task.

A JK is defined as the subjectively rated

likelihood of later retention of presently studied information.

Accuracy of the prediction is determined by even-

tual recall or non-recall of the rated item.

To insure

the validity of the JK, it is necessary to prevent subjects
from withholding responses.

That is, if a subject remem-

bered at the time of test that he had not predicted recall
for that particular item, he/she might withhold the response
in order to achieve correct prediction.

To prevent this,

a game devised by Pasko (Note 3) was employed, and game
points were administered on the basis of correct recall
and use of the JK scale.
A six point scale was provided for the JK rating.
The scale was intended to be dichotomous and to reflect
the degree of confidence in the prediction.

Table 2 con-

tains the JK scale and the conditions under which points
were assigned.

Subjects were instructed that they would

receive +5 points for every word they recalled and -5
points for every word not recalled.

Additional bonus or
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Table 2
Summary of the Rules For Receiving Points in the JK Task
1

2

4

3

No
I will not
recall the item.
1.

5

6

Yes
I will recall
the item.

For each response term recalled on the final trial
you will get +5.

2.

For each response not recalled on the final trial
you will get -5.

3.

If you recall an item, and you indicated a YES,
(e.g. 4, 5, or 6) then you get bonus points.
1

2

3

4

5

6

-3

-2

-1

+l

+2

+3

If you indicated on your JK that you would not recall the item (e.g. 1, 2' or 3) then you will lose
points.
4.

If you do not recall an item you lose 5 points but
you may gain some of the points back if your JK
matched your recall.

That is, if you said you

would not recall an item, then you get bonus points.
1

2

3

4

5

6

+3

+2

+l

-1

-2

-3

Note, however, that if you reported that you would
recall the item, but you didn't, then in addition
to losing 5 points for not recalling the item, you
would be penalized an additional 1, 2, or 3 points.
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penalty points were to be assigned on the basis ·of the
specific JK response.

Briefly, subjects were told that

if their prediction matched their recall performance, they
would receive bonus points corresponding to the degree to
which they were sure that recall would or would not follow.
Likewise, penalty points were determined by the extremeness
of the JK response when it did not match recall performance.
It should be noted that for an accurate prediction of not
knowing (or non-recall), an item was rewarded by as many
as +3 points but that -5 points were assigned for a missed
item.

Consequently, maximum game points could only be

gained by recalling as many items as possible.
Procedure.

Subjects were seen in pairs and were

assigned to groups by a blocked randomization procedure
upon appearance at the laboratory.

All subjects were told

that they were to participate in a memory study and that
their ability to predict what was known would be of importance.

They were instructed that pairs of items (CVC-two-

syllable word pairs) would be presented and production of
the two-syllable word would be required.

They were told

that they would be allowed to see the list several times;
but they were not told that more than one PA list would
be presented for learning.
For the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups, the
specific details of the JK task were explained before presentation of the first list.

Cards displaying the JK

r
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scale and the game's payoff matrix (see Table 2) were
placed in front of the subjects, and the specific rules
were briefly explained.

The concept of prediction was

frequently mentioned throughout the JK task instructions.
Since subjects in the two CONTROL groups did not make JKs
until after presentation of the third list, these subjects
were told that, later in the experiment, they would participate in a game regarding their ability to predict
what was known.
For the learning of the first two lists, study decks
were placed in front of the subject, and he/she was instructed to turn to the next card at the sound of a tone.
Tape recorded tones occurred at a 3 second rate.

Follow-

ing a study trial, subjects in the STUDY-TEST groups were
given an envelope containing a test sheet and were told
to pull the sheet out of the envelope to expose the next
stimulus item whenever they heard a tone.

Next to each

stimulus term, they were to write down the response term.
Subjects were encouraged to guess and were instructed to
place an "X" next to those CVCs for which they could not
produce a response.
a 5 second rate.

Tones during test trials occurred at

Following three such study-test-trial

cycles, subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group were given
an envelope containing the list of study pairs and a JK
rating sheet.

Tones occurring every 5 seconds paced the

subjects through the JK list.

Subjects wrote a scale
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value next to each pair as it was revealed.

In ·place of

the JK rating list, subjects in the STUDY-TEST-CONTROL
group were given a study deck for an additional study
trial.

These subjects· were told that the list would be

presented again at a slower rate, and for this trial,
items were also presented at a S second rate.

Then, for

both STUDY-TEST groups, a last test trial was given.
Subjects in the STUDY-ONLY groups did not receive
test trials following each study trial, and five study
trials were presented.
rate.

Items were shown at a 3 second

After the study trials, subjects in the STUDY-ONLY-

JK group were given the JK rating list followed by a recall test as described above for the STUDY-TEST-JK group.
The STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group received a sixth study trial
before the test trial in place of the JK task.

This pro-

cedure was followed for the first two lists.
For the learning of the third list, all groups were
told that the learning procedure would be slightly different for the third list but that the same type of PAs would
be presented.

Subjects in the STUDY-TEST groups were told

that now they would not be tested after each study trial
but would receive only a single test.

Subjects in the

STUDY-ONLY groups were told that the procedure would be
the same except that fewer learning trials would be allowed.
For subjects in the CONTROL groups, the JK task instructions
were presented at this time, and for all other subjects,
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the instructions were reviewed.

The interval bitween the

end of List 2 and the beginning of List 3 presentation was
approximately equal for all groups.

Following these in-

structions, all subjects studied the third list for three
study trials with no intervening study trials followed by
a JK trial and a final test trial.
The six possible orders of the three item sets were
employed, and within a group, five subjects learned the
item sets in each order.
Subjects.

Subjects were Loyola University undergrad-

uates participating to fulfill a course requirement.
ty subjects served in each group.

Thir-

Four subjects had to be

replaced due to a failure to follow instructions.

RESULTS
Initial analyses were performed to determine whether
differences in recall could be attributed to item sets or
I

rating-test forms.

None of these F ratios reached signif-

icance, and, subsequently, these were not included as factors in any of the analyses of variance to be reported.
The following terms were used to identify factors in
the analyses of variance:

study condition (i.e. STUDY-

TEST vs. STUDY-ONLY); JK experience (i.e. JK vs. CONTROL);
and Lists (1, 2, & 3).
Recall.

Analyses were performed to determine if

study condition and/or JK experience led to different
levels of recall.

Figure 1 displays the mean number of

correctly recalled response terms for the three lists for
each of the four groups.

For the STUDY-TEST groups, these

means are based on the last test trial; and for the STUDYONLY groups, the means are based on the single test trial
recall scores.
Table 3.

The ANOVA source table is contained in

The main effect for study condition reached sig-

nificance, F (1,116) = 8.94, £ < .005.

Although pilot

·work had indicated that recall following three study-test
trials was equivalent to that after five study-only trials,
the STUDY-TEST groups recalled more items on each list

so
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than did the STUDY-ONLY groups.

Furthermore, the main

effect for lists was significant, F (2,232) = 49.35, £ <
.001.

As can be seen in Figure 1, more items were recalled

on the second list than on the other two lists.

The study

condition by list interaction also reached significance,
F (2,232) = 7.71, £ < .05.

Examination of Figure 1 re-

veals that across the first two lists, the increase in
recall for the STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups was similar.

The decrease in recall between Lists 2 and 3 was

slightly greater for the STUDY-TEST groups than for the
STUDY-ONLY groups.

As can also be seen in Figure 1,

there was no main effect for JK experience, F < 1.0.
Subjects making JKs did not recall more items than subjects not making JKs on each list.

Furthermore, there

was no JK experience by list interaction, F < 1.0.
Simple effects analyses were performed to determine
if List 3 recall was affected by study condition and JK
experience.

Contrary to expectations, the STUDY-ONLY

groups did not recall more items on List 3 than the
STUDY-TEST groups, F < 1.0.

Furthermore, the JK groups

did not recall more items on List 3 than the CONTROL
groups, F < 1.0.
The unexpected difference in degree-of-learning
between the STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups might have
been due to differences in recall criterion or willingness to respond with a "guess."

To test for recall
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Mean number of correctly recalled items as
a function of list.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Summary Table
For Correct Recall
Source

SS

JK experience

2.34

1

2.34

study condition (ST) 621.47

1

621.47

JK by ST

8.40

1

8.40

8063.25

116

69.55

718.11

2

359.05

L by JK

8.90

2

8.90

L by ST

112.21

2

56.10

7.71

26.94

2

13.47

1. 85

1688.12

232

7.28

error (between)
lists (L)

L by JK by ST
error (within)

*

E. < • 01

** E. < .005
*** E. < .001

df

MS

F
<1. 0
8.94

**

<1. 0

49.35

***

<1. 0

*
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criterion differences, intra-list intrusions and extralist intrusions were tabulated for each subject.

Also,

the number of incorrect responses which were "close" to
being correct (i.e. sounded like the correct response or
highly associated with the correct response) were counted.
When the frequency of intra-list intrusions was used as
the dependent measure, an analysis of variance revealed
neither a significant main effect for JK experience nor
a significant main effect for study condition, Fs < 1.0.
Intra-list intrusions did increase across lists (Xs =
1.38, 1.23, 1.02 respectively) but the F ratio was only
marginally significant, F (2,232) = 2.53, £ < .07.
of the interactions reached significance.

None

When extra-

list intrusions and "close" responses were tabulated,
so few were produced by each subject that the analyses
of variance were not performed.

Thus it is not likely

that group differences in recall criterion existed in
the present experiment.
The relationship between recall and JK ratings was
examined by comparing the proportion correct recall for
items given each of the six JK ratings.

For example,

for items given a rating of "5", the proportion correctly
recalled was calculated.

These proportions for each

group are plotted in Figure 2.

Since not all subjects

used each of the six JK categories, no analyses of variance were performed on these proportions.
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B contain data from three JK trials for the STUDY-TEST-JK
and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups respectively.
groups (STUDY-TEST-CONTROL
only on the third

list~

The two CONTROL

& STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL)

made JKs

and recall proportions for these

groups are plotted in Panels C and D respectively.

Exam-

ination of the curves reveals an increase in proportion
recall as a function of JK rating.

The higher the rating

the greater the probability of recall.
In describing the results for the STUDY-TEST-JK group
(Panel A), it appears that ratings 1 and 2 and ratings 5
and 6 can be grouped together.

That is, a very low JK

rating was likely to be followed by unsuccessful recall,
and a very high rating was likely to be followed by successful recall.

For this group, ratings of 3 or 4 re-

sulted in approximately .50 probability of recall.
The pattern of results is slightly different for the
STUDY-ONLY-JK group.

In Panel B it can be seen that rat-

ings 1, 2, and 3 tend to be grouped together in terms of
recall probabilities, as are ratings of 4, 5, and 6.

Fur-

thermore, the probability of recall for items given high
JK ratings (5,6) by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group was not as
high as the corresponding probability for the STUDY-TESTJK group.

For each of the control groups, (Panels C

&D)

the List 3 curves are very similar to the List 3 curves
for the corresponding JK groups.

r
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JK Analyses.

Measures of JK accuracy should reflect

the ability to predict what will be recalled and also the
ability to predict what will not be recalled.

Furthermore,

the measure should not· be affected by degree-of-learning.
That is, it should be possible for subjects recalling 30%
and subjects recalling 70% of the items to produce equal
accuracy scores.
To derive an accuracy measure, the JK task was seen
as analogous to an absolute-judgment recognition test.
That is, the subject could respond "YES" (i.e. 4, 5, or
6 on the JK scale) or "NO" (i.e. 1, 2, or 3 on the JK
scale) and, of course, recall or non-recall will follow
for an item.

The combination of these events results in

the contingency table contained in Table 4.

A hit (H)

represents the case of recall being predicted and successful recall occurring.

A correct rejection (CR) indi-

cates that recall was not predicted and, in fact, recall
did not occur.
dictions.

These two outcomes represent correct pre-

Errors in prediction were termed false alarms

(FA, i.e. recall was predicted but did not follow), and
misses (M, i.e. recall was not predicted but did occur).
The task was seen as the "detection" of a recallable
memory trace.

Thus, in a manner similar to signal detec-

tion paradigms, the trace could either be detected or
fail to be detected when the trace was either actually
there or actually not there.

S8

Table 4
Contingency Table for JK Performance and Hypothetical Data
Recall
"YES" JK

HIT

"NO" JK

MISS

Subject #1

YES

Non-recall
FALSE ALARM
CORRECT REJECTION

Subject #2

Subject #3

R

R

R

R

R

R

11

1

11

11

11

1

1

11

1

1

11

1

NO

Measures of JK accuracy
HITS

11

11

11

p (Hit "YES")

.916

.so

.916

p (Hit RECALL)

. 916

.916

.so

HIT-FALSE ALARMS

10

0

10

JK ERRORS

2

12

12

BIAS

0

-.833

+.833
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Accuracy can be defined in terms of JK err6rs, or
M + FA.

Underwood (1974) has shown that errors in a rec-

ognition task can be used as a measure of recognition sensitivity.

He reported· that errors were highly correlated

with d', the sensitivity measure derived from signal detection theory.

Furthermore, Underwood has demonstrated

that the subject's tendency to respond "YES" or "NO," or
his/her criterion can be quantified by the following formula:
BIAS= (M - FA)/(M + FA)

(1)

Underwood reported high correlations between values resulting from Formula 1 and beta as determined by signal
detection theory.

The bias measure and the sensitivity

measure (JK errors) are independent of one another.

The

value produced by the bias formula would be positive if
a subject exhibited a tendency for Ms (i.e. prediction
of non-recall when recall followed), and a negative value
would indicate a tendency for FAs (i.e. prediction of recall when non-recall followed).

Therefore, in the present

experiment, JK errors was used as the primary measure of
accuracy, and the bias score (Formula 1) was used to
examine differences in criterion.
In addition to JK errors, four other dependent measures were considered for use:

(1) total Hs; (2) H minus

FAs; (3) p (H/"YES"), and (4) p CH/Recall).

By examining

data from three hypothetical subjects (see lower half of

r
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Table 4), these measures can be contrasted, and 'the reasons
for using JK errors (M

+

FA) can be clarified.

If Hs were the sole determinant of JK accuracy, it
can be seen in the examples shown that all three hypothetical subjects would perform equally well even though the
subjects differ in the frequency of FAs and Ms.

Further,

this measure would be correlated with overall level of
recall, since greater recall would provide more possibilities for Hs.

Also, this measure would be clearly inade-

quate as a measure of prediction accuracy since the ability to make CRs is not reflected by the score.
Hart (1965) used H minus FAs as a measure of accuracy
in an analogous paradigm.

This is a common "correction

for guessing" strategy used in recognition memory tasks.
The FA rate is considered a guessing rate, and the hit
rate is reduced to account for guessing.

As seen in Table

4, Subjects #1 and #3 would result in equal accuracy scores
if this measure were used.

Subject #3 performed less

accurately when NO judgments are considered.

Thus, this

measure is inadequate since the accuracy of "NO" judgments
does not influence the score.
A third possible measure is the number of Hs relative
to the number of "YES" JK ratings, or:
p (H/"YES") = H/(H

+

FA)

(2)

If this measure were used, again Subjects #1 and #3 in
Table 4 would produce equal accuracy scores.

As was seen
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above, these subjects differ in their ability to' accurately
make NO judgments.
A fourth measure to be considered is the number of Hs
relative to the number.of correctly recalled items, or:
p (H/Recall) = H/(H

+

M)

(3)

Using this measure of accuracy, subjects #1 and #2 from
Table 4 would be equally accurate.

This measure does not

detect differences in prediction for words which are not
recalled.

Misses rather than FAs are crucial to this meas-

ure, and it can be seen that Subject #2 produced many FAs
which did not affect the accuracy score.
Table 4 also contains the accuracy score as measured
by M + FA and the criterion scores produced by Formula 1
for the three subjects.

By examining both measures, dif-

ferences in JK performance can be determined.

Subject #1

is most accurate, and Subjects #2 and #3 are equally accurate.

However, when criterion or bias scores are exam-

ined for the latter two subjects, different response tendencies can be observed.

Therefore, the present experi-

ment used JK errors as the primary accuracy measure and
Formula 1 as the measure of bias.
In the present experiment, JK accuracy should be independent of overall degree of learning.

As was stated

above, the STUDY-TEST groups recalled more items than the
STUDY-ONLY groups, and thus if the JK errors measure was
sensitive to degree-of-learning, any differences in JK
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accuracy between groups may be due to the fact that unequal
degree of learning was obtained.

To be sure that this was

not the case, within each group, fast and slow learners
were determined.

The analyses of variance included the

fast-slow distinction as a factor.

If no main effect for

fast-slow learners is obtained and if no interactions between fast-slow learners and any other factor is obtained,
then it can be concluded that the JK errors measure was
independent of degree-of-learning.

Fast and slow learners

were determined by the total number recalled on the first
two lists.

Within a group, the 15 subjects above the

median constituted the fast learners, and the 15 subjects
below the median constituted the slow learners.

When more

than one subject scored the median value, the assignment
was made randomly in order to assure an equal number of
subjects in each group.
The mean number of JK errors for each of the four
groups (collapsed across fast and slow learners) is displayed in Figure 3.
these data.

Two separate analyses were done on

First, only those groups which made JKs on

all three lists were considered (i.e. the JK groups).
Table 5 contains the summary table for the 2 (study condition) by 2 (fast-slow learners) by 3 (lists) repeated
measures analysis of variance using JK errors as the dependent measure.

A significant main effect for study

condition was obtained, F (1,56) = 10.07,

~

< .001.
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for JK Errors
(MISSES

+

FALSE ALARMS) for the STAND-JK

And STUDY-JK Groups for All Three Lists
Source

SS

df

MS

f

Study cond. (ST) 186.05

1

186.05

Ability (A)

18.05

1

18.05

<1. 0

.93

1

.93

<1. 0

error (between) 1034.35

56

18.47

Lists (L)

48.14

2

24.07

5.44

L by ST

90.83

2

45.42

10.26

L by A

16.03

2

8.02

1. 81

7.08

2

3.54

495.88

112

4.43

ST by

A

L by ST by A
Error (within)

*
**

p <

.01

p < .001

10.07

<1. 0

**

*
**

r
r
!
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Fewer JK errors were made by the STUDY-TEST-JK group (X =
4.88) than by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group (X = 6.92).

A sig-

nificant main effect for lists was also obtained, F (2,112)

= 5.44, £

< .01.

Errors generally declined across lists.

Furthermore, the study condition by list interaction was
highly significant, F (2,112) = 10.26,

£

< .001.

Inspec-

tion of Figure 3 reveals that the mean JK errors for the
STUDY-TEST-JK and the STUDY-ONLY-JK groups decreased at
equal rates across the first two lists.

Furthermore, it

can be seen that the STUDY-ONLY-JK continued to show a
decrease in errors between Lists 2 and 3.

For the STUDY-

TEST-JK group, on the other hand, a sharp increase in JK
errors between List 2 and 3 resulted.

Finally, the main

effect for fast-slow learners failed to reach significance,
F < 1.0.

The mean JK errors for the fast learners were

not different than for the slow learners.

Also, the fast-

slow factor did not interact with study condition (F <
1.0) or lists, F (2,112) = 1.81, £ > .10.
A second JK analysis used data from all four groups.
A 2 (JK experience) by 2 (study condition) by 2 (fast-slow
learners) analysis of variance was performed to examine JK
accuracy (M + FA) for List 3 only.

The source table is

contained in Table 6.

As can be seen, none of the F ratios

reached significance.

Study condition for List 1 and 2

apparently had no effect on List 3 JK accuracy.

Further-

more, experience with the JK task, regardless of study
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance Summary Table
For JK Errors on List 3 Only
Source

SS

df

MS

F

19.20

1

19.20

.83

1

.83

< 1. 0

Ability (A)

1. 20

1

1. 20

< 1. 0

JK by ST

1. 20

1

1. 20

< 1.0

JK by A

.30

1

.30

< 1.0

ST by A

3.33

1

3.33

< 1. 0

JK by ST by A

4.03

1

4.03

< 1. 0

1157.84

112

10.34

JK Experience (JK)
Study cond. (ST)

error

1. 86

r
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condition, had no effect on JK accuracy.

The study condi-

tion by JK experience interaction also failed to reach
significance.

Also, none of the F ratios involving fast-

slow learners reached significance.
The fast-slow learner factor used in the previous
two analyses of variance produced no significant effects.
This suggests that the JK errors measure of accuracy is
not dependent on degree-of-learning, and gives support
to the validity of this measure.
Analysis of JK response bias.

A second important

aspect of the difference in JK performance between the
STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups concerns response biases.
That is, the STUDY-TEST-JK group and the STUDY-ONLY-JK
group may have had different tendencies to respond YES
or NO on the JK scale.

In order to make strong conclusions

about JK accuracy (sensitivity) differences in bias must
be examined.
The bias score derived from Formula 1 can be used to
determine response tendencies.

This measure is theoret-

ically independent of the JK errors (sensitivity) measure;
and in general, this measure reveals differences in criterion or "cutoff" levels .. That is, it measures what level
of confidence or what degree of perceived (memory) strength
is necessary in order for a subject to respond YES on the
JK scale.

A positive bias score indicates a realtively

"strict" or "conservative" criterion (i.e. more Ms than

r
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FAs were observed).

In this case, the subject must be

relatively sure of the presence of an item in memory in
order for a YES JK to be made.
other hand, indicates

A negative value, on the

a less "strict" or more liberal

criterion, and less confidence is necessary in this case
in order to respond YES on the JK scale.
Therefore, differences in JK performance could either
be due to differences in the true ability to detect or
assess an item's strength in memory or be due to differences in the criterion above which an item's presence in
memory is acknowledged.

By examining bias as well as JK

errors greater understanding of the JK performance can
be attained.
Table 7 contains the mean bias score (from Formula 1)
for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups for all
three lists.

An analysis of variance on the data from

Table 9 revealed only a marginally significant main effect for study condition, F (1,56) = 3.94, £ < .1.

It

can be seen that the STUDY-ONLY-JK group had a slightly
greater tendency to commit FAs than did the STUDY-TESTJK group.

That is, the criterion for the latter group

was more strict than that for the former group.

The

study condition by list interaction did not reach significance, F (2,112) = 1.63, £ > .1.

When List 3 bias

scores were examined for all four groups, no differences
between groups was observed.
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Table 7
Mean Bias Score as a Function of Group and List

List
1

2

3

4

STUDY-TEST-JK

-.03

.09

-.16

-.03

STUDY-ONLY-JK

-.47

-.20

-.29

-.32

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

.00

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

-.14
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Additional JK Analyses.

In the JK analyses reported

thus far, JK errors have been of concern.

In order to

more fully understand differences in JK performance between groups, correct JK responses (i.e. Hs and CRs) must
also be examined.

Thus separate analyses of Hs, Ms, FAs

and CRs were performed in order to describe the pattern
of JK outcomes across lists.

Furthermore, the mean num-

ber of YES JKs (i.e. ratings of 4, S, or 6) for each
group was tabulated, since this measure provides a context within which changes in Hs or FAs can be explained.
A YES judgment can only result in an H or FA, and conversely, a NO judgment can only result in an M or CR.
Thus the total number of YES JKs (or NO JKs) must provide a "baseline" around which changes in the specific
JK outcomes can be explained.

Later in this paper, this

pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs, will be used to infer
differences in the ability "to know what is known" and
"to know what is not known."
Table 8 contains the mean number of Hs, Ms, FAs, and
CRs across lists for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK
groups as well as the means for List 3 for the STUDY-TESTCONTROL and STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL groups.

Also, the mean

number of "YES" JKs for each list for each group is contained in Table 9.
Five separate 2 (study condition) by 2 (fast-slow
learners) by 3 (lists) analyses of variance were performed

r
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Table 8
Mean: Number of Hits, Misses, False Alarms, and Correct
Rejections as a Function of Lists
List
1

2

3

x

STUDY-TEST-JK

9.76

13.83

8.57

10.72

STUDY-ONLY-JK

7.76

8.80

7.43

8.00

Hits

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

7.76

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

7.70

Misses
STUDY-TEST-JK

2.16

2.07

2.40

2.21

STUDY-ONLY-JK

1. 90

2.43

1.66

2.00

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

3.03

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

2.70

False Alarms
STUDY-TEST-JK

2.76

1. 76

3.50

2.67

STUDY-ONLY-JK

6.23

4.26

4.26

4.91

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

3.86

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

3.83

Correct Rejections
STUDY-TEST-JK

9.30

6.33

9.53

8.39

STUDY-ONLY-JK

8.10

8.50

10.63

9.08

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

9.33

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

9.76
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Table 9
Mean Number of YES Judgments as a Function of List

List
1

2

3

x

STUDY-TEST-JK

12.53

15.60

12.06

13.40

STUDY-ONLY-JK

14.00

13.06

11. 70

12.92

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL

11. 63

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL

11. 53
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in order to describe the pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, CRs, and
YES JKs for the two JK groups.
The pattern for Hs will be described first.

The

analysis of variance yielded a significant study condition
by list interaction, F (2,112) = 10.53, £ < .001.

A sim-

ple effects analysis revealed that for the STUDY-ONLY-JK
group, Hs were constant across lists, F (1,112) = 2.80,

£ > .10.

For the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the simple effects

analysis revealed significant differences in Hs across
lists, F (1,112) = 42.05, £ < .001.

Hits increased across

the first two lists and then decreased on List 3 for the
STUDY-TEST-JK group.
When Ms were used as the dependent measure (see Table
8) there were no differences between the STUDY-TEST-JK and
STUDY-ONLY-JK groups across lists, F < 1.0.

Therefore,

differences in Ms could not have accounted for differences
in JK performance.
The third analysis of variance concerned FAs.

The

study condition by list interaction reached significance,
F (2,112) = 6.65, £ < .01.

A simple effects analysis re-

vealed differences across lists for the STUDY-ONLY-JK
group, F (1,112) = 6.91, £ < .01.

For this group, FAs

were high on List 1, and then decreased and remained
constant for the second and third lists.

The simple

effects analysis also revealed differences across lists
for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, F (1,112) = 4.05, £ < .OS.
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For this group, FAs were initially lower than for the
STUDY-ONLY-JK group but then increased on List 3.

There-

fore, changes in FAs are likely to account for differences
in JK performance.
The fourth analysis of variance used the frequency
of CRs as the dependent measure.

The study condition by

list interaction was significant, F (2,112) = 6.93, p <
.01.

Again, a simple effects analysis revealed differ-

ences in CRs across lists for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group,
F (1, 112)

= 7. 38,

E_ < • 01.

For this group, CRs stead-

ily increased across lists.

For the STUDY-TEST-JK group,

CRs decreased from List 1 to List 2 and then increased
on List 3, F (1,112) = 12.67, E.. < .01.
The fifth analysis used the frequency of YES judgments as the dependent measure.

There was no significant

main effect for study condition, F < 1.0.

Thus, even

though the STUDY-TEST-JK group recalled more items than
the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the mean number of YES JKs did
not differ for these two groups.

The. study condition by

list interaction reached significance, F (1,112) = 4.40,
p < .OS.

YES JKs consistently decreased across lists for

the STUDY-ONLY-JK group.

For the STUDY-TEST-JK group,

YES judgments increased from List 1 to List 2 but then
decreased on List 3.
The frequency of Hs, Ms, FAs, CRs, and YES JKs was
also examined for List 3 taking into account the CONTROL
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groups as well as the JK groups.

No significant main ef-

fects or interactions were obtained when Hs, FAs, CRs,
or YES JKs were used as dependent measures.

However, when

Ms were considered, a significant main effect for JK experience was obtained, F e1,112) = 4.39,
the CONTROL groups committed more Ms
the JK groups

ex=

2.03).

~

< .OS.

ex=

That is,

2.86) than did

Thus, while JK accuracy on List

3 for the JK groups did not differ from that for the CONTROL groups, a difference in the type of errors produced
was obtained.
Testing Effects.

It has been suggested above that

the JK task is analogous to a signal detection paradigm.
That is, an item in memory can be reported to be either
present or absent when, in fact, that item was either
present or absent.

The analogy is not perfect, however.

That is, in a signal detection task, the experimenter
unambiguously controls the presence or absence of the
signal, but in the JK task, the presence of an item is
inferred from the subject's later recall performance.
Furthermore, since a considerable time lapse occurs between the JK rating and testing of an item, the item
could be forgotten during this interval.

Thus, suppose

a subject assigned a high JK rating to an item, and suppose that the item was, in fact, available.

Interference

from other list items could result in the item being unavailable at time of test, and thus the subject's

r
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prediction, in this case, would be incorrect.
situation could also occur.

The opposite

Facilitation from other list

items could cause an item, previously rated as unavailable
(i.e. a NO JK), to become available at the time of test.
Again, the JK in this case would be considered inaccurate.
To consider these possibilities, the change in the
frequency of Ms and FAs within a test list was examined.
For this analysis, the number of items intervening between
the rating and the testing of each pair (i.e. lag) was
tabulated.

For each test form, the distribution of lags

was divided into quartiles.

The mean proportion of Ms and

FAs as a function of lag quartile is plotted in Figures 4
and 5 respectively.

Two 2 (study condition) by 3 (lists)

by 4 (lags) repeated measures analyses of variance were
performed on these data.

For Ms, there was a significant

main effect for lags, F (3,174) = 8.66, £ < .01.
there was a decrease in Ms across lags.

Overall,

Neither the main

effect for study condition nor any of the interactions
reached significance.

Furthermore, it can be seen in

Panels C and D of Figure 4 that for the two CONTROL groups,
List 3 Ms decreased as a function of lag.

(F (3,348)

=

8.95, £ < .01.)
For FAs, the analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for lags, F (3,174) = 12.65, £ < .01.
A general increase across lags was observed for FAs.
study condition by list by lag interaction reached

The

r
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Figure 4.

Mean proportion misses as a function
lags and list.

(Panels:

A--STUDY-TEST-JK; B--STUDY-ONLY-JK;

C--STUDY-TEST-CONTROL; D--STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL)1
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Mean proportion false alarms as a function
of lags and list.

(Panels:

A--STUDY-TEST-JK· B--STUDY-ONLY-JK·
'
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C--STUDY-TEST-CONTROL; D--STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL)
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significance indicating that the change in FAs across lags
was not identical for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK
groups across the three lists,

(F (6,348) = 4.07, p

.01.)

<

A simple effects analyiis revealed that for the STUDY-TESTJK group, FAs did not differ across lags for the first list,
F (1,464) = 2.21, £ > .10, nor for the second list, F < 1.0.
However, for the third list, a significant linear trend
across lags was obtained,

~

(1,484) = 5.84, £ < .01.

For

the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the simple effects analysis revealed differences in FAs as a function of lags on List 1
and 2, but not on List 3.

A significant linear trend was

obtained for List 1, F (1,464) = 18.46, £ < .001, and for
List 2, F (1,464) = 8.95, p < .01.

No difference in linear

trend was observed for the first two lists, F < 1.0.

In

Figure S, it can be seen that when the two CONTROL groups
(Panels C

&D)

were included_ in the analysis.

FAs general-

ly increased as a function of lag on List 3, F (3,348) =
3.39,

~

<

.OS.

It must be noted that these results are

partially dependent on the total number of recalled items
as a function of lag.

Table 10 contains the proportion

correct recall as a function of lag.

It can be seen that

as lag increases, proportion correct recall decreases.
Thus, conclusions about FAs and Ms as a function of lag
should be interpreted in light of the fact that recall
also decreases as a function of lag.
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Table 10
Proportion Correvt Recall as a Function
·of List and Lag

List
STUDY-TEST-JK

Lag
1

2

1

.533

.544

.438

.472

2

.711

.644

.643

.649

3

.561

.444

.405

.466

1

.527

.405

.344

.333

2

.610

.444

.410

.406

3

.478

.355

.372

.311

.605

. 361

.433

.399

.488

.477

.427

.338

3

4

STUDY-ONLY-JK

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL
3

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL
3

r

DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment show that, in general,
subjects can predict which PAs will be recalled on an upcoming test.

The distinction between the STUDY-TEST-JK

and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups allows several specific conclusions to be made regarding the ability to judge what is
known.
The Role of Test Trials.

In a PA task, JK accuracy

(M + FA) appears to benefit from knowledge of previous
test trial performance.

The results obtained in this ex-

periment provide two lines of evidence in support of this
conclusion.

First, the STUDY-TEST-JK group made more ac-

curate predictions on each of the first two lists than
did the STUDY-ONLY-JK group.

Secondly, the STUDY-TEST-JK

group revealed a marked increase in JK errors on the third
list when test trials before the JKs were removed.

That

is, from the increase in errors, it can be inferred that
the subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group had developed a
strategy for making JKs which was at least partially based
on the success of previous test trial attempts.
The conclusion that JKs are facilitated by the presence of preceeding test trials is partially dependent on
the assumption that subjects can remember what they have
81
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recalled earlier, and some evidence exists which 'supports
this assumption.

Masur et al. (1973) reported that young

children could accurately recognize items they had recalled
on an immediately prece.eding test trial.

Using adult sub-

jects, Lockhart (1975) presented a series of 10 free recall lists followed by a final recognition test on the
words from all 10 lists.

Subjects were then asked to cir-

cle any recognized items which they remembered having recalled.

Accuracy of discriminating recalled from non-re-

called items was found to be quite high.

Thus, given this

evidence, in the present study it can be reasonably assumed
that subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group could distinguish
those items that they had recalled from those that they had
failed to recall on the test trials preceeding the JK trial.
Therefore it is likely that subjects were implicitly reasoning "since I got it right on the last two test trials, I
should get it right again."
The Role of Familiarity.

As familiarity with task de-

mands increases, JK accuracy increases.

The STUDY-TEST-JK

group revealed an increase in JK accuracy across the first
two lists, and for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group JK accuracy increased across all three lists.

From the performance of

the two CONTROL groups, it appears that the familiarity
with PA learning, rather than the familiarity with the JK
task itself, is crucial.

That is, on the third list, the

two CONTROL groups that had no previous JK task experience,

,
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performed as accurately on the third list as did.the two
JK groups.

Thus while JK accuracy can be said to increase

with practice, actual JK task experience is not as important as is experience with learning under the constraints
of the task at hand.
Specific JK Performance Differences.

In order to more

fully understand differences in JK performance between the
STUDY-TEST-JK and the STUDY-ONLY-JK groups, two specific
questions must be answered.

First, both these groups re-

vealed a decrease in JK errors across the first two lists,
and it should be determined whether, for both these groups,
the decrease occurred for the same reason.

That is, did

the same pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs result for both
these groups on the first two lists?

The second question

concerns the reasons for the increase in JK errors on the
third list for the STUDY-TEST-JK group.
The results relevant to the improvement in JK accuracy
by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group will be summarized first.

From

the analyses of JK outcomes, the following four findings
can be noted:

(1) YES JKs declined across lists; (2) Hs

and Ms remained constant; (3) FAs generally decreased
across lists, and (4) CRs increased across lists.

Given

this pattern of results, any changes in JK performance
must have been due to FAs and CRs, since the other outcomes did not change.

Furthermore, since YES judgments

decreased across lists, differences in the accuracy of

r
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NO judgments were likely to account for the JK improvement.
That is, FAs indicate the lack of the ability to detect
what is not in memory; and CRs reflect the ability to successfully indicate thai an item is not in memory.

Since

FAs were decreasing while Hs remained constant, and since
CRs increased while Ms remained constant, the ability to
know what is not known was apparently accounting for the
improvement in JK accuracy for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group.
With respect to the increase in JK accuracy across
the first two lists shown by the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the
following findings should be considered:

(1) YES JKs and

Hs increased; (2) Ms did not change; (3) FAs decreased
slightly across the first two lists, and (4) CRs decreased
sharply across the first two lists.

From this pattern of

results, it can be shown that Hs are responsible for the
increase in accuracy across the first two lists.
reasoning is as follows.

The

Since FAs decreased while Hs

increased, the ability to know what is known (as opposed
to what is not known) must have improved.

The ability to

know what is not known was less likely to account for the
improvement because CRs decreased and Ms remained constant.
In fact, the ability to predict what was not known was
probably constant across the first two lists for this
group.

That is, since the overall frequency of NO judg-

ments declined, and since Ms did not change, a decline in
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CRs would have to occur.

This would not necessarily imply

a decrease in the accuracy of NO judgments.
Correlations support the conclusion that Hs are responsible for the increase in accuracy.

That is, if the corre-

lation between Hs and JK errors increases from List 1 to
List 2 for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, Hs are likely to be
implicated in the improvement.

The correlation increased

from -.41 to -.49 on List 2.
Thus for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the increase in JK
accuracy across the first two lists was probably due to
an increase in the ability to know what was known; while
for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the improvement was due to
an increase in the ability to know what was not known.
The STUDY-TEST-JK group showed a marked increase in
JK errors between Lists 2 and 3.

This increase correspond-

ed with the removal of test trials before the JK task on
the third list.

Given the analyses of the JK outcomes,

the following results relevant to this increase in errors
can be considered:

(1) YES JKs and Hs decreased; (2) FAs

slightly increased; (3) CRs increased across lists, and
(4) Ms did not change.

These observations are made rel-

ative to List 2 JK performance.

The decline in YES judg-

ments (or increase in NO judgments) was accompanied by an
increase in CRs (with Ms remaining unchanged).

Thus, on

the one hand, accuracy of NO judgments cannot account for
the decrease in accuracy because, in fact, the accuracy
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of NO judgments improved on List 3.

On the other hand,

FAs are likely to account for the increase in errors.
That is, YES JKs and Hs both declined but not at the same
rate.

Given that a YES JK can only result in an H or FA,

it must be concluded that FAs would have to increase since
the decline in YES JKs was less than the decline in Hs.
This suggests that a greater likelihood of FAs was causing
the decrease in accuracy.
clusion.

Correlations support this con-

The correlation between JK errors and FAs rose

from .48 on List 2 to .SS on List 3.

An increase in FAs

indicates a decrease in the ability to know what is not
known.
Bias Scores and Testing Effects.

Additional differ-

ences in the JK performance of the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDYONLY-JK groups can be pointed out by examining the criterion or bias scores and the testing (or lag) effect data.
Furthermore, it should be determined whether or not the
reasons given for JK improvement for these two groups are
consistent with bias scores and lag effects.
Conclusions about the relationship between specific
.patterns of JK outcomes (i.e. Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs) and
bias scores should be prefaced by a brief discussion of
the possible redundancy (or interdependence) of these
measures.

Bias scores reflect a relative tendency for Ms

or FAs, and from this measure, either a "strict'' or "lax"
criterion is inferred.

Theoretically, this measure is
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distinct from the absolute level of FAs or Ms considered
I

separately.

Thus a subject exhibitirig many FAs would not

show a lax criterion if he also exhibits an equal number
of Ms.

However, this assumption cannot be unequivocally

accepted given the fact that, in the present experiment,
FAs correlated -.71 with bias scores, and Ms correlated
.78 with bias scores.

Thus, the following statements

must be interpreted cautiously, knowing that the bias
scores and the Ms and FAs are not totally independent.
For the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, it can be concluded
that subjects made JKs using a relatively "lax" criterion.

That is, since there was a greater tendency for FAs

for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group than for the STUDY-TEST-JK
group, it can be inferred that less "strength" of the
memory trace was required for a YES judgment for the former group than for the latter group.

As accuracy of NO

judgments increased across lists, one would expect to
observe a more and more "strict" criterion being employed.
An increase in the accuracy of NO judgments implies an

increase in the ability to asses an item's memory strength
_as inadequate for later retrieval.

This can be seen as a

"raising" of the level of memory strength necessary for a
YES JK response.

In fact bias scores did become less neg-

ative (or more strict) on the second and third lists relative to the first list.

Thus, for the STUDY-ONLY-JK

group, the criterion data are consistent with the conclusion
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that accuracy of NO judgments accounted for the improvement in JK accuracy across lists.
As was stated earlier, an increase in FAs within a
list as lag (number of intervening events between rating
and testing) increases indicates that other list items
interfered with items given YES JKs and thus caused these
items to be unavailable at time of test.

If a lax criter-

ion were being used, then one would expect greater lag
effects than if a strict criterion were being used.

That

is, items with low levels of memory strength are more
likely to be interferred with than items with higher levels
of memory strength.

For the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, lag ef-

fects for FAs were greater on List 1 and List 2, and then
became less extreme on the third list.

This is as expected

since the criterion became more strict across lists.

A

strict criterion indicates that only well-learned items
are given YES JKs, and well-learned items are less likely
to suffer from interference across time.
The improvement in JK accuracy across the first two
lists shown by the STUDY-TEST-JK group was due to an increase in Hs.

An H implies that the perceived level of

memory strength was adequate to assure later recall.

This

should correspond with a rather "strict" JK criterion; and
relative t6 the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, a more strict criterion was employed on the first two lists by the STUDY-TESTJK group.

Furthermore, lag effects for FAs were minimal
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across the first two lists for the STUDY-TEST-JK.group.
This indicates that, in general, only well-learned items
were given YES JKs.
On List 3, the STUDY-TEST-JK group revealed a decrease
in JK accuracy and it was suggested that FAs or inaccurate
YES JKs accounted for this poorer performance.

That is,

subjects in this group more frequently gave YES JKs to
items which were eventually not recalled when test trials
were removed than when test trials were present before the
JK trial.

As would be expected, this corresponded with a

more lax criterion on the third list than on the first two
lists.

Again, the lag effect data for FAs for this group

is consistent with the lowering of the criterion.

For the

STUDY-TEST-JK group, there was a greater lag effect for FAs
on the third list than on either of the first two lists.
For all groups, Ms generally decreased as a function
of lags.

Two possible interpretations are available for

this effect.

First, subjects could have developed a strat-

egy of withholding responses or of selectivity ignoring
items for which they remembered giving NO JKs.

Thus, if

an item was given a NO judgment, non-recall would result
in an accurate prediction.

Perhaps, the subjects realized

this only as they progressed through the test list, and
thus, the greater the lag, the greater the likelihood of
their having developed a strategy of selective rehearsal
or withholding of known responses.

This interpretation

90
can be rejected for several reasons.

First, subjects were

instructed that under the "game" rules, they would always
be penalized for non-recall regardless of the prediction.
In fact, if they were trying to "beat" the game, Ms should
have increased since an M always resulted in gaining points
and a CR (i.e. deliberate withholding or selective rehearsal of an item given a NO JK would result in a CR) always
resulted in losing points.

A more convincing argument

against the notion that subjects were withholding or selectively rehearsing items and thereby causing the lag
effects is that the lag effects for Ms were constant across all three lists.

If subjects were becoming aware

of these strategies with increasing JK task experience,
then the lag effect should have been "learned" by the time
the subjects reached the third list.

Thus, one would not

expect lag effects for Ms on the third list.

Furthermore,

if a strategy of withholding or selectively rehearsing
were being employed, memory for an items rating at the
time of test would be necessary.

The shorter the interval

between rating and testing, the more likely subjects would
be to remember which rating was assigned.

Thus, at short

lags, one would expect fewer Ms than at longer lags.

The

opposite results were observed.
Lag effects for Ms were also obtained in a similar experiment by Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) and the procedures
they employed were also designed to prevent selective
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rehearsal or withholding.

In the first experiment reported

by these authors, lag effects were obtained with highly
practiced subjects who were specifically warned against
the use of withholding or selectively rehearsing items.
In their second experiment, they used a probed recall technique, such that the subject did not know which of five
presented items would be tested.

Many Ms were observed

when the probed item was the last item in the list.

Thus

these authors also found lag effects for Ms when the possibility of withholding and selective rehearsal were removed.
A more acceptable interpretation of the lag effects
for Ms concerns facilitation and interference from other
list items and the subject's perception of the task.

It

should be noted that, in general, items with short lags
occurred relatively late in the rating list and relatively
early in the test list.

Furthermore, an M means that an

item judged to be of insufficient strength was in fact of
sufficient strength to assure recall.

The misjudgment

could be due to either a "misperception" of an item's
_strength or an unexpected increase of an item's strength.
First consider "misperceptions" of memory strength.

A

subject had no way of telling which items would be tested
and thus he might have been judging an item's memory
strength as sufficient or insufficient to assure recall
at the "expected" lag.

The expected or average lag would
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have been about 24 items.

Thus, an item judged to be of

insufficient strength at the expected lag may have been
of sufficient strength at lags less than the expected 24.
Thus, if Ms were to occur, they would most likely occur
at the shortest lags.

The second reason for misjudgments

could be that some unexpected increase in an item's memory
strength occurred.

This increase could be said to be due

to facilitation from other list items.

However, since

over time, interference would be causing a decrease in an
items availability, an item would become available because
of facilitation only at the shorter lags.

That is, if an

item's strength is low to begin with and is decreasing
across time, any events which could increase that item's
strength and would be most effective when strength is
highest.

In other words, facilitation would be most

likely at the shortest lags.

This was likely to account

for the lag effects for Ms.
JK Performance by the CONTROL Groups.

On List 3,

the two CONTROL groups predicted their recall just as
accurately as did the two JK groups.

Furthermore, the

specific patterns of JK outcomes, the bias scores, and
the testing effects found for the CONTROL groups were
not markedly different from the JK groups.

The only dif-

ference was that the CONTROL groups exhibited more Ms
than the JK groups on the third list indicating that the
CONTROL groups had a slightly greater tendency to be
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inaccurate with NO judgments.

However, overall ·accuracy

as measured by JK errors (M + FA) did not differ between
groups on the third list.

Two interpretations of the

failure to find a difference between the CONTROL and JK
groups can be offered.
It can be suggested that the kinds of information
that contribute to JKs are inherently involved in the
learning of a PA list.

That is, perhaps subjects in the

STUDY-TEST-CONTROL group were covertly deciding, for example, that more study time should be spent on items that
they had missed on preceeding tests.

Subjects in the

STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group may have been allocating attention or processing effort on the basis of what can be
called implicit JKs.

Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) have sug-

gested this commonality of demands between a JK task and
a standard PA learning task.

Zacks (1969) also suggested

that covert self-regulation of processing efforts may be
occurring in PA learning.

If this interpretation is to

be accepted, fast learners should have been more accurate
than slow learners, and this was found not to be the case.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that PA learning inherently involves those processes on which JKs are based.
A second interpretation of the equal JK accuracy
shown by the CONTROL and JK groups on List 3 is based on
the role of tests.

In any learning task (i.e. free recall,

recognition as well as PA learning) tests provide

''feedbac~'
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to learners (LaPort

&Voss,

1974a, 1974b).

Since all groups

were tested on each list, all subjects must have gained an
understanding of what was required for "mastery" of a list
given the constraints of the learning procedures.

As was

concluded above, familiarity with the learning procedures
rather than with the JK task was crucial to eventual JK
performance.

Furthermore, with learning experience with

a particular type of learning material (i.e. PAs) subjects
could also attain a greater understanding of what is necessary for learning.

Since subjects in the CONTROL groups

had an equal amount of learning and testing experience as
the JK groups, their understanding of task demands or their
acquisition of "process knowledge" would have been equivalent to that for subjects in the JK groups.

Thus, JK per-

formance for the JK groups and the CONTROL groups might
have been equal because both groups acquired the appropriate process knowledge on the first two lists.

This expla-

nation is admittedly speculative, and the present experiment did not include control groups relevant to this question.

This issue could be directly tested if the experi-

ment were replicated with the addition of two groups.

Sup-

pose one group was instructed to learn the first two PA
lists but was not tested on the items, and then learned
the third list, made JK ratings, and received a test trial.
If this group was found to be less accurate than a group
given the STUDY-ONLY-JK instructions, one could conclude
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that testing was crucial to the development of ptocess
knowledge useful for later JK performance.
suppose one group

~f

Furthermore,

subjects received the STUDY-ONLY-JK

instructions but that for the first two lists as different
type of PA was to be learned (i.e. letter-digit pairs).
If the JK accuracy shown by this group was less than that
shown by a group that learned CVC-word PAs on all three
lists, then it could be concluded that process knowledge
is partially dependent on the type of material that is to
be learned.

If these results were obtained, it could be

concluded that equivalent process knowledge had been acquired by the JK and CONTROL groups in the present experiment.
Stimulus Knowledge.

Thus far in this discussion,

only two proposed sources of information which contribute
to JKs have been discussed:
it retrieval.

process knowledge and implic-

In the introduction to this paper stimulus

knowledge, or an understanding of those item characteristics which determine learning ease, was suggested as a
source of information relevant to a JK.

Arbuckle and

Cuddy (1969) concluded that the perception of the ease
or difficulty of items was important for the prediction
of recall or non-recall.

Perhaps certain pairs used in

the present experiment were more easily associated than
others, and thus if a subject were aware of these a priori
differences in

ease of learning (EL), JKs might have
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been influenced by this stimulus knowledge.

To determine

whether JKs were related to the perceived EL for the given
pairs, and to see if JKs contained any information other
than stimulus knowledge the following analysis was performed.
The proportion correct recall for each of the 72 pairs
was determined by collapsing recall data for the first two
lists from the CONTROL groups.

Data from these groups were

used in order to obtain measures of recall probability that
are uninfluenced by the performance of JKs.

Further, the

mean JK rating assigned to each pair was computed by collapsing JK ratings from the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLYJK groups for all three lists.

Thus, each mean was based

on 60 ratings.
To obtain EL ratings, the 72 PAs were shown to 36 additional subjects who were naive to the purposes of the
present experiment.

These subjects were instructed to

pretend that they were shown these pairs several times and
that for testing, only the

eve

would be shown and the pro-

duction of the response term would be required.

The sub-

. jects were asked to rate each pair on how easily it could
be learned.

A six-point scale ranging from very difficult

(1) to very easy (6) was provided.

Five seconds were

allowed for the rating of each pair.
It was found that the items' mean EL ratings were
highly correlated with the items' probability of recall
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(r(70)

=

.63, £ < .001) and with the mean JK rating assigned

to an item (r(70) = .73, £ < .001).

Moreover from the orig-

inal subjects it was learned that the probability of recall
of an item correlated .83 (df = 70,
JK rating.

~

< .001) with the mean

If stimulus knowledge (i.e. mean EL rating)

completely accounted for the relationship between recall
and mean JKs, then a part correlation between probability
of recall and mean JK predicted by EL, should be near zero.
The part correlation was significantly greater than zero,
(r(70) = .54,

£

< .001).

The decrease in the correlation

indicates that to a certain extent, JKs were related to
perceived EL.

However, stimulus knowledge does not com-

pletely account for an item's JK rating.

Under different

learning conditions perhaps stimulus knowledge would become a much more important determinant of JKs.
General Conclusions and Implications.

The present

experiment demonstrates that learners can predict what
will be recalled with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
This "ability to know what you know" benefits from the
knowledge of the success of previous retrieval attempts.
Therefore, this implies that students' study habits should
include self-testing.

Self-testing or practice testing

would lead to an accurate assessment of what is known and
thus study time could efficiently be allocated to that
which is not known.

Furthermore, since JK accuracy gen-

erally improved with increasing familiarity with specific
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learning and testing procedures, the ability to know what
is known can be said to depend on an understanding of the
manner in which the information will be tested.

With

greater practice with a certain type of test or with a
certain kind of to-be-learned material, accuracy of knowing what is known will increase.
A limitation of the present experiment was that only
one type of stimulus material and one type of testing procedure were employed.

Subsequent research should deter-

mine the degree to which prediction ability or experience
acquired during PA learning transfers to other learning
situations.

For example, does the experience of predicting

PA recall facilitate the prediction of sentence retention?
Furthermore, in addition to the prediction of recall, can
subjects accurately predict which items will be recognized?
Future research should answer these questions.
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APPENDIX A
Paired-Associate Lists
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

nos--gadfly
lom--offshoot
tol--deceit
kew--nephew
yep--unit
laq--session
lem- -charter
pum--venom
mac--tidbit
wer--buffoon
bik--madness
vam--folly
dut--upkeep
nup--abbess
fub--encore
lur--item
dal--garret
tux--concept
nes--impact
pom--chloride
siz--pressure
dow--impulse
hib--reflex
mik--boredom

het--foible
wof--preview
buk--adage
tem--maker
gel--nonsense
vug--research
hup- -vapor
dof--proxy
mot--friction
ril--frontage
xic--hatred
raq--vigor
tif--patent
neb--array
kav--outcome
ren- -prestige
fis- -rating
wes--workhouse
rox--hearing
jor--tribute
fer--victim
bod--kindness
fow--crisis
las--rosin
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kol--chaos
nep--belief
gos--welfare
fen--traction
yeg--savant
fim--namesake
sek--vision
gid--context
jow--forethought
nas--steerage
lor--essence
hus--blessing
jun- -franchise
cuz--feline
fok--hardship
tog--satire
dil--assault
rew--onslaught
cid--hindrance
gur--gender
pit- -mischief
bov--northwest
sik--malice
lox--surtax
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